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Abstract
We study various aspects of the impact of funding liquidity constraints and capital ﬂows, which
proxy for supply and demand considerations of liquidity respectively, on two measures of the common
component of FX market liquidity across developed and emerging market currencies, transaction costs
and market depth. Funding liquidity constraints reduce FX market liquidity, after controlling for global
volatility, and have a stronger impact when the amount outstanding of repos is associated with an increase
in the costs of funding and a shortening of their maturity. Increasing capital ﬂows at the global level
increase liquidity. Demand and supply determinants of liquidity have also a stronger impact during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis, when liquidity dry-ups were severe. The analysis on individual currencies with
diverse riskiness conﬁrms that a shock to speculator capital would lead to a reduction in market liquidity
through a spiral eﬀect that is stronger for more volatile currencies. Furthermore, more volatile currencies
have a stronger exposure to the liquidity eﬀect of capital ﬂows.
Keywords: foreign exchange; liquidity; funding liquidity constraints; capital ﬂows; microstructure.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F31; G15.
1 Introduction
Trading volume in the foreign exchange (FX) market is particularly high compared to other ﬁnancial markets.
Whether the large trading volume corresponds to a highly liquid FX market depends on the deﬁnition of
liquidity adopted and the proxy employed to measure it. With respect to trading volume and the bid-ask
spread, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across currencies both in the level of liquidity and its time-variation.
Furthermore, measuring liquidity as the temporary price impact of transactions, recent studies have found
that there is a common component in FX market liquidity across currencies. This common component often
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referred to as commonality in FX market liquidity can arise from variations in the determinants of dealer
inventory levels, which is one of the two channels that microstructure has identiﬁed of how dealers operations
aﬀect market liquidity (Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1981).1 For example, variations in market interest rates
are likely to induce co-movements in inventory carrying costs, and optimal inventory levels which lead in
turn to co-movements in bid-ask spreads of individual assets, a proxy for liquidity. Studies have found that
this common component in FX market liquidity exhibits a strong variation through time (Banti, Phylaktis,
and Sarno, 2012; Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2013).
Recently, a literature on the interaction of market liquidity and funding liquidity has emerged in order to
provide an explanation to the severity of the liquidity drop observed during the recent ﬁnancial crisis (Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010; Acharya and Skeie, 2011; Acharya
and Viswanathan, 2011). That is, traders’ ﬁnancial constraints inﬂuence the liquidity of ﬁnancial markets
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002). It is important to underline the systematic nature of
such an eﬀect: funding liquidity constraints aﬀect all the operations of traders, creating a systematic source
of variation in liquidity across ﬁnancial assets.
Furthermore, recent theoretical studies have proposed an eﬀect of institutional investors’ behavior and
correlated trading as a source of commonality across assets and markets (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008;
Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2012). In an empirical investigation of the stock market, Karolyi, Lee, and van
Dijk (2012) show that these demand-side factors are more relevant as determinants of liquidity commonality
across stocks than the supply-side factors related to the funding constraints story.
Building on the recent theoretical literature on the interaction of funding liquidity and market liquidity,
we examine whether the time-variation in FX market liquidity is due to changes in the funding liquidity of
the principal traders in FX, namely the ﬁnancial intermediaries. Indeed, bearing in mind that the ease with
which ﬁnancial intermediaries are able to ﬁnance their operations has an impact on traders’ operations in the
cross-section of the ﬁnancial assets they trade, we expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between changes in
funding constraints and market illiquidity. In line with the literature on the role of the demand of liquidity,
we extend our analysis to the investigation of correlated trading across investors into the FX market by
considering the capital ﬂows between the US and the relevant countries. Furthermore, we take into account
a variable related to the inventory control risk and market uncertainty, namely global FX implied volatility
(Copeland and Galai, 1983). Our approach is empirical in line with Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam
(2001) investigation of the determinants of market liquidity in the stock market.
Our paper is related to a recent paper by Mancini et al. (2013) which identiﬁes a negative relationship
1The other channel is the asymmetric information channel (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom,
1985).
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between the VIX, a proxy for ﬁnancial uncertainty, and the TED spread, an indicator of funding liquid-
ity constraints, and FX market liquidity for the most traded currencies during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
However, our paper investigates the impact of not only supply but also demand side factors of FX market
illiquidity. Our broad data set of 20 currencies from both developed and emerging markets over 14 years
allows us to explore various aspects of the impact of funding liquidity constraints and capital ﬂows, a proxy
for demand considerations of liquidity. These include (i) whether funding liquidity dry-ups are worse during
the recent ﬁnancial crisis when funding became a serious issue as stressed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009); (ii) whether when extending the analysis to individual currencies the impact of funding liquidity
constraints is stronger for illiquid currencies as a shock to speculator capital would lead to a reduction in
market liquidity through a spiral eﬀect that is stronger for more volatile, less liquid currencies, as again pro-
posed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); and (iii) whether correlated trading in the FX market aﬀect
the time variation of FX market liquidity as conﬁrmed for the stock market by Karolyi et al. (2012).
Liquidity is a broad concept and no unique deﬁnition exists. Several proxies have been developed to
measure it, each referring to some speciﬁc aspects. Using a broad data set for 20 daily exchange rates
of both developed and emerging markets’ currencies over 14 years, we employ the daily percentage bid-ask
spreads as our measure of individual currency illiquidity. Averaging across individual currencies, we construct
a measure of illiquidity in the FX market. Thus, our main proxy for FX market illiquidity measures the
level of transaction costs. Investigating the determinants of liquidity commonality across currencies, we ﬁnd
that the commonality is stronger for more volatile currencies and when the market uncertainty is high.
In order to proxy for funding liquidity, we consider the conditions on the secured interbank market in New
York and London, which host over 75% of global FX turnover (BIS, 2013). We show that a lowering in the
availability of repurchase agreements for ﬁnancial intermediaries is associated with a decrease in transaction
costs, that is an increase in the liquidity of the FX market. Moreover, we consider the impact of increasing
the cost of funding and shortening of repos maturities on this relationship. Furthermore, we take into account
the conditions of the liquidity demand and show that as investors buy or sell the currencies vs USD to enter
or exit the foreign markets, they exert a pressure on the liquidity of the currency markets. In more detail,
we show that increasing capital ﬂows at the global level reduce the illiquidity in the FX market. Overall, our
explanatory variables capture an appreciable fraction of the monthly time series variation in market wide
liquidity of around 20%.
The length of our sample period allows us to explore whether liquidity dry-ups are worse during the recent
ﬁnancial crisis, when liquidity funding became a serious issue and capital ﬂows experienced a severe drop.
We show that both factors of demand and supply of liquidity have a stronger impact on market illiquidity
during the crisis.
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Our ﬁndings are robust to controlling for global FX volatility. Global FX volatility is found to increase
transactions costs, consistent with previous studies at the individual currency level. However, while global
FX volatility is able to explain a share of the changes in market liquidity, it does not drive out the eﬀect of our
explanatory variables on market liquidity. Even though our supply and demand side proxies and volatility
are intertwined, their eﬀect on market liquidity can be individually measured. Extending the market level
analysis and building on the role of volatility to determine the commonality in liquidity across currencies,
we investigate the impact of funding liquidity and capital ﬂows in the analysis of individual currencies. In
our sample we have currencies with diverse riskiness. We take that into account in our panel estimation and
conﬁrm that a shock to speculator capital would lead to a reduction in market liquidity through a spiral
eﬀect that is stronger for more volatile currencies and during crisis periods (Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009). Furthermore, we ﬁnd that capital ﬂows exert a stronger impact on the liquidity of more volatile
currencies, especially in normal market conditions.
Our results are robust to another measure of liquidity that has recently received signiﬁcant attention,
namely the temporary return reversal inspired by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), which relates to the depth
of the market.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section the methodology for the construction of our
liquidity measures and proposed determinants is presented. Section 3 reports some preliminary analysis of
the data and the results of the regression analysis. Robustness tests, which include the extension of our
analysis to the measurement of liquidity at another time period, when liquidity in the market is lower,
and ﬁltering for the extreme behavior of the Turkish lira during the 2000-2001 crisis and seasonality, are
conducted in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology and data
2.1 Estimation of FX market liquidity
No unique deﬁnition of liquidity exists. According to Kyle (1985), liquidity is a “slippery and elusive
concept” because of its broadness. In fact, the concept of market liquidity encompasses the properties of
“tightness”, “depth”, and “resiliency”. These attributes describe the characteristics of transactions and their
price impact. In particular, a market is liquid if the cost of quickly turning around a position is small, the
price impact of a transaction is small, and the speed at which prices recover from a random, uninformative
shock is high. In our analysis, we are employing the percentage bid-ask spreads as a proxy for transaction
costs. The bid-ask spread is the most widely used measure of liquidity in the FX market e.g. Bessembinder
(1994), Bollerslev and Melvin (1994), Lee (1994), and Hsieh and Kleidon (1996).
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However, the bid-ask spread suﬀers from some limitations as a measure for liquidity. For example,
Grossman and Miller (1988) highlight that the bid-ask spread gives the cost of providing immediacy of the
market maker in the case of a contemporaneous presence of buy and sell transactions. Furthermore, because
the spread is valid only for transactions up to a certain size, it provides no information on the prices at which
larger transactions might take place, or how the market might respond to a long sequence of transactions
in the same direction, which could be generated when a trader breaks a large trade into many smaller ones,
that could span several days. In contrast, measures such as those proxying for price impact capture that
aspect better than the bid-ask spread Vayanos and Wang (2013). As a result of these possible limitations,
we extend our analysis to another liquidity measure, which proxies for the price impact to obtain a more
complete picture, a modiﬁed version of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure in section (4.4) .
We build the daily series of percentage bid-ask spreads of the USD against other currencies following
the American system and we employ the percentage spread to increase comparability across currencies, as
follows:
PSPRi,d =
(aski,d − bidi,d)
midi,d
, (1)
where aski,d, bidi,d andmidi,d are the daily series of the ask, bid and mid prices of the USD against currency i.
We obtain the monthly series, PSPRi,t, by taking the end of the month observations of the daily series. The
percentage bid-ask spread measures transaction costs. Hence, the larger the spread, the larger transaction
costs and the lower the liquidity level. It is important to note that the percentage spread measure is thus a
measure of illiquidity.
In order to build these illiquidity measures, we employ daily data for 20 bid, ask and mid exchange rates of
the USD versus 20 currencies for a time period of 14 years, from January 01, 1999 to December 31, 2012. Of
the 20 currencies in the data set, 10 are of developed economies (Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Danish
krone, euro, Great Britain pound, Japanese yen, New Zealand dollar, Norwegian kroner, Swedish krona, and
Swiss franc) and 10 are of emerging markets (Brazilian real, Chilean peso, Czech koruna, Hungarian forint,
Korean won, Mexican peso, Polish zloty, Singaporean dollar, South African rand, and Turkish lira).2 The
selection of the currencies reﬂected the importance of the currencies in FX trading according to BIS (2010)
and the availability of data.3
We obtained the daily series from Datastream (WM/REUTERS). The quotes provided by WM/Reuters
are collected at 16 GMT, which is the time of highest liquidity in the FX market.4 For a large sample of the
2The classiﬁcation in developed and emerging countries above does not correspond to the IMF classiﬁcation, but follows
instead common practice in the FX market.
3The Turkish lira experienced substantial distress during the Turkish crisis of 2000/2001. For robustness, we run the main
analysis excluding this currency from the sample to conﬁrm that our results are not driven by its extreme behavior during those
years.
4As a robustness, we employ an alternative measures of illiquidity by taking the observations of the bid, ask and mid quotes
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currencies in our data set (AUD, CAD, CHF, CZK, DKK, EUR, GBP, HUF, JPY, MXN, NOK, NZD, PLN,
SGD, SEK, TRY, ZAR)5 the ask and bid rates are from actual trades and they are calculated independently
as the median of actual trades during a ﬁxing period (one minute). If actual trade rates are not available,
quoted rates are reported. For the other currencies (BRL, CLP, KRW), the bid and ask rates are quotes
from Reuters.6
Next, we calculate market illiquidity by averaging across currencies the individual percentage spread
series (e.g. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000a); Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)), as follows:
psprt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
PSPRi,t. (2)
Since we are interested in the changes of market illiquidity and we are not able to reject the hypothesis
that pspr is non-stationary, we take the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the logs of the market illiquidity measure just
calculated:
Δilliqt = log(psprt)− log(psprt−1). (3)
Running a regression of individual currency illiquidity on market illiquidity, we ﬁnd that market illiquidity
can explain a substantial proportion of the movements in individual currencies illiquidity (Table 1A in
Appendix A). Furthermore, in accord with Mancini et al. (2013), we ﬁnd that more liquid FX rates, such
as the EUR/USD and GBP/USD tend to have lower liquidity sensitivity to market wide FX liquidity. The
opposite is true for less liquid FX rates, such as the Brazilian Real /USD, the Korean won/USD, Turkish
Lira/USD and the Hungarian forint/USD.
2.2 Funding liquidity constraints
Building on the recent theoretical literature on the interaction of funding and market liquidity, we examine
whether changes in the availability of funding to traders determine the time-variation in FX market liquidity.
Funding liquidity is deﬁned as the ease with which traders can obtain funding. During the recent
ﬁnancial crisis, funding markets have experienced severe distress. Interestingly, diﬀerent sources of funding
responded diﬀerently to these events. While unsecured interbank ﬁnancing halted after Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy and returned to be available only to the most credit-worthy counterparties after AIG bailout,
severe uncertainty in the future value of collateral led to a near collapse of the repo market in the US
(Krishnamurthy, 2010; Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar, 2011; Gorton and Metrick, 2012). These events on the
at 21.50 GMT, which is a time of lower liquidity in the FX market but that is relevant as it corresponds to the closing of the
main US stock exchanges. These data is provided by Thomson Reuters.
5For the abbreviations of currencies see notes in Table 1A in Appendix A.
6It should be noted that Phylaktis and Chen (2009) ﬁnd using various information measures that the matched tick by tick
indicative data bear no qualitative diﬀerence from the transaction data and have higher information content.
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major funding markets were deeply intertwined with the dynamics of trading in the ﬁnancial markets. In fact,
the presence of constraints to the ability of traders to ﬁnance their operations may aﬀect negatively market
liquidity (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Acharya and Skeie, 2011; Acharya
and Viswanathan, 2011). Moreover, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Acharya and Viswanathan
(2011) provided theoretical evidence of illiquidity spirals precipitated by the interaction of declining asset
prices and low availability of ﬁnancing.
In the theoretical literature, ﬁnancial constraints are deﬁned as margin requirements (Gromb and Vayanos,
2002; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer, 2011; Garleanu and Pedersen,
2011), as limits to the availability of external capital ﬁnancing (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) or as short-term
debt that needs to be rolled over (Acharya and Skeie, 2011; Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; Huang and
Ratnovski, 2011). The largely short-term nature of ﬁnancing arises mainly from borrowers inability to com-
mit to a speciﬁed maturity structure in the presence of a number of lenders (Brunnermeier and Oehmke,
2013). Moreover, Acharya and Skeie (2011) looks at lenders’ own rollover-risk that provide an incentive to
short term ﬁnancing as opposed to longer term one. These funding characteristics are generally measured
in empirical studies by the volume or cost of the diﬀerent sources of funding that is more frequently found
on the liability side of the balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions.
Empirically diﬀerent proxies are used to measure the conditions with which ﬁnancial intermediaries can
access ﬁnancing. These measures reﬂect the diﬀerent sources of wholesale ﬁnancing available to ﬁnancial
intermediaries that are found on the liability side of their balance sheet.
Some studies focus on unsecured short-time funding and employ measures based on the interest rates.
The Fed Funds interest rate, the TED spread, the LIBOR-OIS spread, and ﬁnancial commercial paper
interest rates are measures of the cost of unsecured funding (Coﬀey and Hrung, 2009; Acharya and Skeie,
2011; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian, 2011; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Chiu, Chung, Ho, and
Wang, 2012). Given the unsecured nature of these sources of ﬁnancing, it is restricted to more credit-worthy
ﬁnancial institutions and it is more volatile in times of distress.
Given the presence of collateral, secured short term ﬁnancing is a less costly and more stable source of
funding. In fact, collateralized borrowing is at the heart of ﬁnancial intermediaries’ operations. Adrian and
Shin (2010) show that ﬁnancial intermediaries adjust their leverage in a procyclical manner, that is increasing
leverage during booms and reducing it during busts, and the margin of adjustment in the expansion and
contraction of their balance sheets is through repurchase agreements and reverse repurchase agreements.
Indeed, several studies focus on the amount outstanding and interest rates of repurchase agreements (repos)
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Coﬀey and Hrung, 2009; Adrian, Etula, and Shin, 2010; Adrian and Shin,
2010; Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; Griﬀoli and Ranaldo, 2011) as proxies for ﬁnancing conditions. In
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addition, other studies look at another measure of collateralized borrowing, such as asset-backed commercial
papers (ABCP) (Acharya and Skeie, 2011; Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; Chiu et al., 2012).
Speciﬁcally to the FX market and funding conditions, Mancini et al. (2013) use the TED spread to
document the impact of changing funding constraints on FX market liquidity during the crisis. Looking
at exchange rates and funding conditions, Adrian et al. (2010) analyze the funding liquidity ability of US
ﬁnancial intermediaries by considering the amount outstanding of commercial papers and repos, and ﬁnd that
changes in funding liquidity aﬀect exchange rate variation of some currencies versus the US dollar. Moreover,
Coﬀey and Hrung (2009) and Griﬀoli and Ranaldo (2011) investigate the impact of funding conditions on
deviations from the covered interest parity conditions and look at the repo rates on MBS collateral and
general collateral, respectively.
Finally, ﬁnancial institutions can access funding via discount windows at their central banks. However,
they do so only when other sources are unavailable because of the relative higher cost and bad signaling.
2.2.1 The repo market
While the unsecured interbank market is generally more volatile, costlier and restricted to higher quality
counterparties, short-term secured funding is the preferred source of wholesale ﬁnancing for ﬁnancial institu-
tions (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Afonso et al., 2011; Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Financial institutions generally
enter repo contracts to ﬁnance their purchases of securities. In a standard repo contract, the initiating party
sells a security at a discount, determined by the haircut or margin, with the agreement to buy it back at a
later date at an agreed price plus a premium, the repo rate. The most common collateral in the US and UK
markets are sovereign securities, either Treasuries or Gilts, which enjoy relatively low credit risk and high
liquidity. The trading activity of ﬁnancial institutions is largely conducted via collateralized borrowing on
these markets, with a preference for short maturities to reduce risk and lower the cost of borrowing IMF
(2013). If longer term positions or activities need to be funded, traders generally proceed to roll over their
positions and enter into new contracts to terminate the old one. The preference for short-term maturities is
stronger in times of uncertainty. In fact, the term sectors of both secured and unsecured interbank markets
have experienced the largest drop during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Financing constraints may be tightening in several respects. First of all, if the amount of repos available is
low, funding is scarce and ﬁnancial institutions are likely to experience funding constraints. Second, funding
constraints may be binding when the cost of funding increases. In this case, higher repo rates may be related
to more stringent funding constraints. Finally, the lower availability of term repo contracts may be indicative
of constraints in obtaining funding. In fact, when the level of uncertainty in the market increases, funding is
generally tighter at longer horizons. Overall, we consider the volume of repos issued as the more informative
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of the general conditions of funding. In fact, low amount outstanding of repos may be due to a low demand,
which in turn may be caused by high repo rates, high haircuts, or strict collateral requirements, or by
rationing from the suppliers of funds. While representative of some source of constraints, repo rates may be
low but funding may be generally rationed and only available to more creditworthy parties. Furthermore,
low rates can be accompanied by stricter collateral requirements and higher haircuts.
Hence, in order to investigate the implications of funding conditions on FX market liquidity, we employ
the amount outstanding of repos as a measure of funding availability. We consider the repo markets in the
US and UK because New York and London are the two main ﬁnancial centers for FX trading.7
The data of the outstanding amount of US repos is collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on
a weekly basis. It comprises the opened positions of primary dealers, serving as trading counterparties of the
New York Fed in its implementation of monetary policy. We construct the monthly series of the overnight
amount outstanding by taking the last observation of the month available. The data of outstanding amount
of UK repos is collected by the Bank of England at the end of the month and it includes the amount
outstanding of all sterling repos of monetary ﬁnancial institutions versus the private sector.
Since we are interested in the tightening of funding liquidity and we cannot reject the null of non-
stationarity, we take the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the logs of the amount outstanding of US and UK repos, as
follows:
Δrepoct = log(REPO
c
t )− log(REPOct−1) c = [US,UK] (4)
where REPO is the monthly series of the amount outstanding of repos in the US and UK respectively.
We expect to ﬁnd a negative relationship between changes in funding liquidity and changes in FX market
illiquidity. In fact, a decrease in repos amount outstanding is associated with a decrease in the volume of
funding available to traders. As a result, traders are expected to decrease their operations leading to an
increase in FX market illiquidity.
Funding liquidity constraints may materialize also as an increase in the cost of funding or a decrease in
the maturity of the contracts. To account for these considerations, we build proxies for the cost of funding
and the shortening of the maturities in the repo market.
We proxy for the cost of funding in the US repo market with the 3-month US LIBOR-OIS spread that
has been found to be highly correlated with the repo rate with Treasuries as collateral in the US (Gorton
and Metrick, 2012).8 The data is available from Bloomberg starting in the 2001. For the UK repo market,
we obtain the series of the end of month 3-month Gilt repo rates from the Bank of England. We take the
7According to BIS (2013), London and New York together account for 75% of the overall trading volume in FX
8Applying the LIBOR-OIS spread decomposition of Schwarz (2014) in its liquidity and counterparty risk components, Gorton
and Metrick (2012) showed that the counterparty risk component is the only signiﬁcant.
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ﬁrst diﬀerence of the two variables because they exhibit non-stationarity:
Δratesct = RATES
c
t −RATESct−1 c = [US,UK] (5)
where RATES is the monthly series of the repo rates proxied by the US LIBOR-OIS for the US and the
Gilt repo rate for the UK.
Finally, we construct a measure of the maturity structure of repos outstanding. We build the measure
only for the US repo market because the breakdown of amount outstanding depending on the maturity,
overnight vs term, is not available for the UK. We build a ratio of the overnight amount outstanding over
the total amount outstanding, as follows:
matct =
REPOshortt
REPOshort+termt
. (6)
We interpret mat as an indicator of the shortening of the maturities of the funding available.
2.2.2 Financial ﬁrms stock returns
We include in our analysis another indicator of tightness of capital in the market, which relates to the
quality of institutions. Financial constraints are likely to be binding when the quality of ﬁnancial institutions
declines. In fact, an increase in counterparty risk may lead suppliers of funds to ration credit. Moreover,
funding conditions may be related to the quality of ﬁnancial institutions that provide funds. In fact, less
funding may be available due to the inability of funding suppliers to lend as they experience distress (Acharya
et al., 2011). Hence, we include the stock returns of ﬁnancial institutions in the US as a proxy for their
overall credit quality.
Following Hameed et al. (2010), we obtain daily data on the stock returns of investment banks and
securities brokers and dealers listed in the NYSE from the CRSP database.9 We begin by calculating excess
returns by regressing individual stock returns on the value-weighted NYSE market return provided by CRSP:
reti,d = αi + βimktd + i,d (7)
excreti,d = i,d
where excret are the daily series of returns for each stock i in excess of the market return mkt.
The common component across the stocks is then obtained by taking the cross-sectional weighted-average
of the individual series, where the weights are the market capitalization of the stocks at the end of the previous
9We include the stocks identiﬁed by the SIC code 6211.
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year over the total market capitalization of the stocks in the sample, as follows:
excretd =
N∑
i=1
wi,dexcreti,d for d = 1, .., T. (8)
Finally, we obtain the monthly series excrett by taking the last observation of the series in the month.
We expect the quality of the ﬁnancial institutions to be negatively related to FX market illiquidity.
However, stock returns of ﬁnancial institutions are aﬀected by several other factors unrelated to funding
conditions. As such, we expect to ﬁnd the linkage to be stronger when the ﬁnancial system is under distress
(Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman, 2000b; Hameed et al., 2010).
2.3 Aggregated capital ﬂows
In addition to funding considerations, we extend the analysis to the implications of changes in the demand
for liquidity.
Most recently, Karolyi et al. (2012) ﬁnd that conditions on the demand side aﬀect the commonality in
liquidity across stocks. They measure demand-side determinants with a series of proxies derived for the stock
markets of a variety of countries. Following their insights and focusing on the FX market, we investigate
whether international capital ﬂows exert pressure on the FX market and aﬀect its liquidity over time, as
investors require liquidity on the currency markets to enter/exit foreign stock and bond markets.
We measure capital ﬂows as the aggregated ﬂow of international capital between the US and foreign
countries. The monthly data on bilateral ﬂows is from the U.S. Department of Treasury. We take the inﬂows
and outﬂows of equity and bond investments between the US and the 20 countries whose currencies are
included in our sample. We aggregate the capital ﬂows across countries and we measure the investment
pressure on the FX market as the sum of inﬂows and outﬂows. Indeed, we are interested in the demand
of the currency pair. So, irrespective of whether investors purchase or sell the foreign currency for the US
dollar, their demand of the currency pair is still positive. Hence, we build the common measure across
currencies as follows:
flowsi,t = equity
in
i,t + equity
out
i,t + bond
in
i,t + bond
out
i,t , (9)
flowt =
20∑
i=1
flowsi,t for t = 1, .., T
where equity and bond are the equity and bond investment series between the US and country i, and the
superscripts in and out indicate inﬂows and outﬂows.
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Finally, we log-diﬀerence the series because it exhibits non-stationarity in levels:
Δflowt = log(flowt)− log(flowt−1). (10)
2.4 Global FX volatility
We include global FX volatility in our analysis to control for the level of uncertainty in the FX market
(Menkhoﬀ, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf, 2012). Following the inventory control theoretical models, an
increase in the volatility aﬀects the riskiness associated with holding inventory in the currencies involved.
The increase in the uncertainty will thus result in a decrease in liquidity. While this relationship is found
for individual currency liquidity (Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994; Bessembinder, 1994; Ding, 1999), it should
also be in place once market-wide liquidity is considered. An observed increase in FX market volatility will
impact the riskiness of holding any inventories in FX, thus leading to a decrease in the liquidity of the FX
market as a whole.
We employ the JP Morgan VXY volatility index that captures the implied volatility from currency options
of G7 countries and we take the last observation in the month to build our monthly series. Since the series
exhibits non stationarity, we take the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the logs of the measure, as follows:
volt = log(vxyt)− log(vxyt−1). (11)
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Preliminary analysis of the data
3.1.1 Description of the data
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in levels (panel a) and diﬀerences (panel b). The
average percentage bid-ask spread in the FX market in our period is 0.09% with a relatively small standard
deviation of 0.03%. In contrast, the proxy of changes in FX market illiquidity exhibits a strong variability,
with a relatively high standard deviation over the mean. Turning to the amount outstanding of repos, the
US market is the largest, with an average monthly amount of over USD 1.5 trillion as opposed to GBP
65 billions in the UK repo market. Moreover, the aggregated ﬂows have averaged USD 3 trillions during
our sample period with some degree of variation, reaching the peak of over USD 8 trillion in August 2007.
Overall, all our measures, except ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, present a high serial correlation. Generally,
the serial correlation are lower for the diﬀerenced variables. Furthermore, the diﬀerenced variables have a
signiﬁcantly higher variability as opposed to the levels.
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Figure 1 presents the level and change of FX market illiquidity. The series exhibit strong variation
through time. Indeed, both the level and changes in transaction costs exhibit a high variation during the
ﬁrst part of the sample period. In particular, there are spikes in illiquidity during 2000, when Turkish lira
were hit by a severe ﬁnancial crisis. Figure 2 plots the patterns of the common component in liquidity across
currencies when the TRY is removed from the sample. The impact of the Turkish lira distress on the analysis
is evaluated in section 4.2, where the Turkish lira is excluded by the sample of currencies and the results of
the main analysis are conﬁrmed.
The graphical analysis of the supply-side explanatory variables present common patterns of sharp in-
creases in funding constraints during the recent ﬁnancial crisis (Figures 3 and 4). As an exception, the level
of UK repo amount outstanding were rather unaﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis and their drop is registered
later, with the start of the European sovereign debt crisis. In contrast, ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns present
a sharp drop prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers, that coincides with the ﬁrst signs of ﬁnancial distress
in the system as in August 2007 BNP Paribas announced its inability to evaluate its subprime collateralized
investments (Figure 5). In Figure 6, aggregated capital ﬂows share a common pattern with the US repo
amount outstanding, as they increased steadily during the sample period to drop sharply during the crisis.
They however quickly recovered and started rising again. Global FX volatility is plotted in Figure 7. It
shows a strong variation through time and signiﬁcant spikes during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
The correlation matrix is reported in Table 2. While the correlation coeﬃcients between the levels need
to be interpreted with caution due to the presence of a time trend in the variables, it is possible to note
some relationships. There is a strong negative correlation between FX market illiquidity and the amount
outstanding of repos, at around -50%. Moreover, the two measures of repos are highly correlated, with
a coeﬃcient of 56%. Turning the attention to the rates, UK repo rates are positively correlated with FX
market illiquidity, with a coeﬃcient of 51%. In contrast, the proxy for US repo rates has a relatively low and
negative correlation with illiquidity. There is no evidence of correlation between the two proxies for repo
rates. The last variable for funding conditions is positively correlated with FX market illiquidity, even if the
coeﬃcient is smaller at 14%. The demand-side variable, aggregated ﬂows, has a strong negative correlation
with FX market illiquidity, at around 56%. Overall, the coeﬃcients decline when the changes in the variables
are considered, suggesting that indeed the time trend is an important component of the large coeﬃcients
between the levels of the variables. Nonetheless, the direction of the relationship is largely unchanged. We
account for this in the analysis and focus on the diﬀerenced variables.
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3.1.2 Commonality in liquidity
Before turning to the analysis at market level, we study our market illiquidity proxy more in detail and focus
on the determinants of the commonality in liquidity across the currencies. In more detail, we investigate the
interaction between currencies’ liquidity and its demand and supply, through the eﬀect of changing funding
conditions, capital ﬂows and market uncertainty on the liquidity commonality across the currencies.
Following Karolyi et al. (2012), we measure the commonality between currency and market illiquidity by
the explanatory power, or R-squared, of a regression of the daily changes in the currency percentage bid-ask
spreads on the changes in the common component across all the currencies, as follows:
Δilliqi,d = αi + βiΔilliqd + εi,d. (12)
To obtain the monthly series of commonality for each currency, we run the above regression with daily data
for each month independently and store the R2. Following Karolyi et al. (2012), we employ the logistic-
transformation of the R-squared, rsq = log[R2/(1− R2)], and end up with a monthly series for each of the
20 currencies in our sample, rsqi,t.
We investigate the determinants of the commonality via a panel regression with ﬁxed eﬀects of the R-
squared measures on the liquidity supply and demand factors identiﬁed in section 2. With respect to the
capital ﬂow measure, we do not employ the aggregated measure across countries because we are able to use
each measure of capital ﬂows between the US and each of the countries, thus capturing more precisely the
eﬀect of the pressure of the investment ﬂows, to and from each country, on their currencies against the USD.
Moreover, we include the realized volatility in each currency, measured by the standard deviation of daily
currency returns in the month (Vi,t), in addition to our measure for FX market uncertainty, the implied
global FX volatility (volt).
In more detail, we run the following regression:
rsqi,t = α+ βΔXt + δrsqi,t−1 + εt (13)
where the matrix with the explanatory variable is ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t ,
excrett,Δflowsi,t, Vi,t, volt].
Conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Karolyi et al. (2012) for the stock market, the demand-side factor does oﬀer
some insights, while funding conditions are not signiﬁcant (Table 3).10 In fact, the positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient associated with aggregated ﬂows suggests that currencies aﬀected by larger capital ﬂows experience
10We only report the regressions with the explanatory variables, which are statistically signiﬁcant.
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stronger commonality. Furthermore, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) commonality is stronger for
more volatile currencies and when market uncertainty is higher.
3.1.3 VAR analysis
In this section we start the analysis of the determinants of FX market illiquidity by investigating the dynamics
of the relation between market liquidity and its demand and supply.11 Hence, we include the variables into
a VAR to conduct some structural analysis.
In more detail, we run the following VAR with 1 and 3 lags according to the Swartz and Akaike criteria
respectively:
ΔXt = α+
L∑
l=1
βΔXt−l + εt for L = [1, 3] (14)
where ΔX is a matrix with the changes in the endogenous variables: FX market illiquidity and the main
demand and supply factors. The demand is measured by aggregated capital ﬂows and we restrict the funding
conditions in the two markets to the amount outstanding of repos in the US and UK for parsimony.12
The results in Table 4 show little evidence of dynamics. The correlation coeﬃcients of the VAR innova-
tions are generally signiﬁcant, but not high, providing evidence of some commonality in shocks across the
variables. There is evidence of causality from UK repos to FX market illiquidity, but there is generally weak
reverse causality. The reverse causality is present in the VAR with 3 lags from FX market illiquidity to UK
repos and aggregated ﬂows. The IRFs do not show evidence of signiﬁcant reactions to shocks in the system.13
It is important to note that data availability allows us to study the dynamics only at low frequency and the
system may be more dynamic at higher frequencies.14 Nonetheless, in our analysis we concentrate on the
contemporaneous impact of these factors on illiquidity and exclude the presence of signiﬁcant dynamics.
3.2 Regression analysis
3.2.1 Market illiquidity, funding constraints and capital ﬂows
We conduct a regression analysis to test whether movements in the proposed variables explain a sizable share
of variation in FX market illiquidity.
11As noted by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Acharya and Viswanathan (2011), although funding liquidity constraints
aﬀect all operations of traders creating a systemic source of variation in liquidity across ﬁnancial assets, the eﬀect may work
also in the other direction. Changes in market liquidity can have a signiﬁcant impact on the conditions at which funding is
available to traders. Thus, by estimating a VAR we hope to pick up these possible dynamics.
12We do not include the repo rates and ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ returns to allow the VAR to clearly identify the interaction between
market illiquidity and its supply and demand factors, and avoid the noise from the interaction between the repo market variables.
13The IRFs are not reported, but available from the authors upon request.
14Also, the monthly frequency prevents us from investigating the VAR during the crisis due to the limited number of
observations.
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Hence, we run the following regression of the changes in market illiquidity on the proposed determinants:
Δilliqt = α+ βΔXt + σvolt + ϕΔilliqt−1 + εt, (15)
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt]. Δrepos
US and ΔreposUK are
the log-diﬀerenced repos amount outstanding in the US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced
repo rates in the US and UK, excret are the ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, Δflow are the aggregated capital
ﬂows between the US and foreign countries. We include the global FX implied volatility, vol, as a control
variable for market uncertainty. Finally, one lag of the dependent variable accounts for the serial correlation
in the residuals.
Table 5 reports the results. Looking at funding liquidity constraints, changes in the amount outstanding
of repos in both markets are signiﬁcant in explaining changes in the transaction costs. In detail, the negative
coeﬃcients tell us that tightening funding liquidity constraints result in an increase in transaction costs.
Proxies of repo rates are not signiﬁcant, conﬁrming their inferior ability to capture the conditions of funding
markets in comparison to volume-related measures. Financial ﬁrms’ excess returns are also insigniﬁcant in
this analysis. Turning to the demand-side factor, increases in capital ﬂows are associated with declines in
FX market illiquidity. Thus, as global investments in equity and bonds increase, the liquidity of the FX
market improves. Finally, global FX volatility is signiﬁcant in explaining the movements in FX market
illiquidity, consistently with previous studies at the individual currency level (Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994;
Bessembinder, 1994; Ding, 1999). The coeﬃcient is positive as expected, since an increase in uncertainty is
associated with an increase in transaction costs. The regressions have a relatively high explanatory power,
with adjusted R-squared around 20%. As expected given the negative serial correlation of our illiquidity
measure, the lagged dependent variable is statistically signiﬁcant.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that FX market illiquidity is aﬀected by both conditions of the supply and
demand. Indeed, as funding liquidity and aggregated capital ﬂows increase, FX market liquidity improves.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd evidence that international investment ﬂows do not subtract liquidity on the currency
markets, but rather contribute to make those markets.
3.2.2 The eﬀect of funding cost and maturity
Funding constraints are not only binding when funds available decline, but also when their cost increases
and their maturity shortens. Having documented a signiﬁcant impact of changes in funding aggregates on
FX market illiquidity, in this section we consider the implications of funding costs and shortening of the
maturity on this liquidity eﬀect.
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While repo rates do not aﬀect FX market illiquidity directly, they may have an impact when the costs
are associated with changes in volume. To capture these indirect eﬀects, we interact our proxies of amount
outstanding of repos with dummies for decreases (dummy−) and increases (dummy+) in the repo rates.
Moreover, we investigate the maturity eﬀect and we interact the amount outstanding in repos with dummies
for shortening (dummy−) and lengthening (dummy+) of the maturities of repos.15
In more detail, we run the following regression:
Δilliqt = α+ β
US,+(dummy+ ∗ΔreposUSt ) + βUS,−(dummy− ∗ΔreposUSt ) (16)
+ βUK,+(dummy+ ∗ΔreposUKt ) + βUK,−(dummy− ∗ΔreposUKt ) + σvolt + ϕΔilliqt−1 + εt,
where dummy+ and dummy− are dummies for increases and decreases in repo rates or maturities.
Table 6 reports the results. For the UK repo market, the cost eﬀect is signiﬁcant. In fact, the interaction
term of increases in repo rates and the amount outstanding of repos is negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Hence, in the UK repo markets the liquidity eﬀect of tightening funding conditions is also related to increases
in the cost of funding. The same eﬀect is not found in the US repo market.16 The interaction of the
liquidity eﬀect with the maturity of repo contracts shows that maturity plays a role in the impact of funding
constraints on FX market illiquidity. In particular, the liquidity eﬀect is stronger when the change in the
amount outstanding of repos is associated with a shortening of their maturity.
To summarize, this section documents a signiﬁcant interaction of the impact of funding on FX market
illiquidity with the cost and maturity of the funding available. Hence, we can conclude that changes to the
volume of funding available have a stronger impact on liquidity when they are associated with an increase
in the cost and a decline in the maturity of the funding available.
3.2.3 The recent ﬁnancial crisis
Given that market declines are indicative of funding liquidity constraints, we explore whether funding liquid-
ity dry-ups are worse during the recent ﬁnancial crisis (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).17 Furthermore,
capital ﬂows declined sharply during the crisis, expanding the demand for liquidity in the currency markets.
We use a dummy, which takes the value of 1 during the period from Lehman Brothers collapse on
September 2008 to July 2009, when the US recession ended, and 0 otherwise. We interact this indicator of
the recent crisis with our measures of changes in funding conditions and aggregated ﬂows. We control for
15As noted in section 2.2.1, we restrict the analysis of the maturity eﬀect to the US repo market due to limitations in
availability of UK data.
16The lack of signiﬁcance for the US repo market may depend on the less precise US measure that is a proxy for repo rates,
while the UK measure is the actual repo rates for gilts.
17Our data set enables us to study several important crisis episodes. However, we restrict the analysis to the latest crisis
when funding liquidity became a real constraint for ﬁnancial intermediaries.
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the non-crisis period with an interactive term of the variables with a dummy that takes the value of 0 for
the crisis episode, and 1 otherwise. In detail, we run the following regression:
Δilliqt = α+ β(dummy
crisis
t ∗ΔXt) + γ(dummynocrisist ∗ΔXt) + δvolt + ϕΔilliqt−1 + εt (17)
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt]. Δrepos
US and ΔreposUK are
the log-diﬀerenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced
repo rates in the US and UK, excret are the ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, Δflow are the aggregated capital
ﬂows between foreign countries and the US, and vol is the global FX implied volatility. Finally, one lag of
the dependent variable accounts for the serial correlation in the residuals.
Table 7 shows the results of the analysis and present a rather clear eﬀect. As expected, during the crisis
the eﬀects of funding constraints and aggregated ﬂows are stronger. In fact, the coeﬃcients associated with
he crisis dummy are generally double the non-crisis ones.
3.2.4 The impact of funding liquidity and capital ﬂows across currencies
To complete the analysis of the impact of demand and supply factors on illiquidity, we turn our attention to
the level of the individual currencies. In this section, we investigate whether currencies that exhibit higher
volatility also present the largest impact of changes in funding liquidity constraints on illiquidity, in accord
with proposition 6(iv) of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Furthermore, we extend the investigation to
the demand-side of liquidity and analyze the interaction between the liquidity impact of aggregated capital
ﬂows and volatility.
We employ measures of changes in illiquidity of individual currencies, by taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
the logs of all series and build a matrix of changes in monthly transaction cost over time for each currency.
Next, we include the measures in a panel regression with ﬁxed eﬀects and we estimate the impact on the
changes in individual currency illiquidity, Δilliqi,t, of changes in the explanatory variables interacted with
individual currency volatility:18
Δilliqi,t = α+ β(ΔXt ∗ Vi,t) + ϕilliqi,t−1 + εt (18)
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt] and Vi are the series of each
currency realized volatility. ΔreposUS and ΔreposUK are the log-diﬀerenced repo amount outstanding in
the US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are the
ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, and Δflow are the aggregated capital ﬂow between foreign countries and the
18We measure the volatility for each currency as the monthly standard deviation of daily currency returns.
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US. Finally, we include in the regression one lag of the dependent variable to account for the serial correlation
in the residuals.
Table 8 presents the results of the regression in panel a. Conﬁrmation of the relationship between
currency illiquidity and volatility is reported in model (1), as more volatile currencies are associated with
higher illiquidity. Interacting the volatility of currencies with funding constraints, we ﬁnd that more volatile
currencies suﬀer the stronger eﬀects on illiquidity of US repos and UK repo rates. Moreover, the volatility
eﬀect is present also with respect to the demand-side factor. In fact, the interactive term of volatility with
aggregated ﬂows is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, we can conclude that more volatile currencies
are also more strongly aﬀected by changes in capital ﬂows.
Finally, we investigate whether the volatility eﬀect is related to the crisis episode. Using the crisis and
no-crisis dummies described above in equation (17), we interact them with our explanatory variables in this
context, as follows:
Δilliqi,t = α+ β(ΔXt ∗ Vi,t ∗ dummycrisist ) + γ(ΔXt ∗ Vi,t ∗ dummynocrisist ) + ϕilliqi,t−1 + εt. (19)
Table 9 conﬁrms the presence of an asymmetric eﬀect of volatility depending on the conditions of the market.
As expected from the theoretical predictions of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), the impact of repos in
the US on the more volatile currencies is signiﬁcant during the crisis, when funding constraints are generally
tighter. This conﬁrms the evidence found in our main analysis in relation to the crisis. Interestingly, the
demand-side factor reacts diﬀerently, and more volatile currencies present stronger impact of aggregated ﬂow
on their illiquidity during normal times.
In summary, we ﬁnd that demand and supply factors’ impact on market illiquidity is related to the
volatility of the currencies. Indeed, funding liquidity conditions are mostly relevant for volatile currencies
during the crisis. In contrast, aggregated ﬂows are signiﬁcantly associated with volatile currencies in normal
times.
4 Robustness tests
4.1 FX market liquidity at New York markets close
In this section, we conduct the main analysis with an alternative measure of liquidity estimated at a diﬀerent
time during the day, when the FX market liquidity is generally lower. This time corresponds to the close
of New York stock exchanges. In more detail, we take the bid, ask and mid prices collected at 21.50 GMT,
or 16.50 EST, by Thomson Reuters and available from Datastream. We employ the data to build a new
measure of FX market illiquidity following the procedure described in section (2.1). We then run the main
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regression analysis (15) with this new measure.
The results presented in Table 10 conﬁrm the main ﬁndings. Tightening funding liquidity constraints in
the US and UK repo markets have strong positive eﬀects on FX market illiquidity. In addition, the illiquidity
eﬀect of aggregated ﬂows is still signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the coeﬃcients associated with the explanatory
variables are higher than in the main analysis, as it is the explanatory power of the regressions. Hence, the
liquidity demand and supply factors are stronger when the level of liquidity in the FX market is scarce.
4.2 Filtering the FX market liquidity measure
The graphical analysis in Figures 1 and 2 shows a sharp rise in the level and variation of market illiquidity
during the Turkish crisis in 2000-2001. To exclude that our main results are driven by the extreme behavior of
the Turkish lira, we remove the TRY from the sample of the currencies and estimate the common component
in illiquidity across the remaining 19 currencies.19 Next, we estimate the main regression analysis (15) with
this new measure. The results in Table 11 (panel a) conﬁrm the robustness of the main analysis to the
behavior of the Turkish lira.
Moreover, we evaluate whether the results of the main analysis are robust to the ﬁltering for seasonality
of our illiquidity variable. This is to account for the eﬀects documented in Bessembinder (1994) and Ding
(1999) of increases in FX spreads before weekends.
We ﬁlter the daily measures of transaction costs for each currency, PSPRi from equation (1), for the
day-of-the-week eﬀect by running the following regression:
PSPRi,d = α+ βDummyd + εd (20)
where Dummy = [dummyMonday, dummyTuesday, dummyWednesday, dummyThursday].20 The residuals from
this regression are the ﬁltered illiquidity measures. We take the last observation of each month from the
daily series. The common component across the currencies is then obtained from equations (2) and (3).
Finally, we run the main regression analysis (15) with this new measure.
The results in Table 11 (panel b) conﬁrm the robustness of the main results to the ﬁltering for seasonality.
4.3 Unexpected changes in FX market illiquidity
In the analysis of the determinants of the time-variation in FX market illiquidity, we looked at changes in
common illiquidity. As a robustness check, we now investigate whether unexpected changes, or shocks, to
FX market illiquidity have the same determinants identiﬁed so far.
19The systemic eﬀect of the crisis on the illiquidity of other currencies is still present, even after excluding the TRY.
20The dummies take the value of 1 for the days of the week, and 0 otherwise. The eﬀect of Fridays is captured by the constant.
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In order to identify the unexpected component of changes in FX market illiquidity, we take the residuals of
an AR(1) model of the common illiquidity measure as our proxy.21 In detail, we run the following regression:
Δilliqt = α+ βΔilliqt−i + εt (21)
and we take εt to be our measure of shocks in FX market illiquidity, Δilliq
UNEXP
t . Next, we run the main
regression analysis (15) (excluding the lagged dependent variable) with this measure of shocks in FX market
as the dependent variable.
We report the results in Table 12. Indeed, the analysis of shocks does conﬁrm the determinants found to
be signiﬁcant in explaining changes in FX market illiquidity.
4.4 FX market depth
In our main analysis above we analyzed changes in transaction costs as a measure of changes in the illiquidity
of the FX market. Here, we extend our analysis to a diﬀerent proxy for FX market liquidity. We employ the
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s measure and estimate liquidity as the expected temporary return reversal
accompanying order ﬂow. The Pastor-Stambaugh measure of liquidity captures the return reversal due to
the behavior of risk-averse market makers, thus identifying market depth. Indeed, a market is deep if large
trades are executed without a substantial price impact. We employ the measure of FX market liquidity
developed in Banti et al. (2012). This measure is available from January 1999 to July 2008.22
We run the main regression analysis (15) with this alternative liquidity measure. Table 13 shows the
results. Extending our analysis of the relationship to another measure of liquidity, we ﬁnd the availability of
funding liquidity to traders to be still an important determinant of FX market liquidity. Only the variable
for the US repo market is signiﬁcant and this is reasonable since this measure of market liquidity captures
the trading activity of ﬁnancial institutions based in the US. However, the demand factor is not signiﬁcant
in this context.
5 Conclusions
The recent ﬁnancial crisis brought attention to the eﬀects of variations in funding liquidity. In this paper,
we, provide a systematic analysis of the impact of funding liquidity constraints on FX market illiquidity.
21We take an AR(1) model because it allows us to eliminate serial correlation from the residuals so that we take as our
measure for shocks the unexpected component of changes in FX market illiquidity.
22The FX transaction data is obtained from State Street Corporation, one of the major custodian institutions with about
10,000 institutional investor clients and about 12 trillion US dollars under custody. The data provided by SSC is the daily
order ﬂow for our 20 currencies, deﬁned as the overall buying pressure on the currency in millions of transactions. How-
ever, the transaction data provided by SSC is not exactly the raw net number of transactions, but is the net ﬂow ﬁltered
through a ‘normalization’ to increase comparability through time and across currencies and to ensure SSC commitment to
client conﬁdentiality.
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Our broad data set of 20 currencies from both developed and emerging markets over 14 years allows us to
explore various aspects of the impact of funding liquidity constraints. Our results conﬁrm the prediction
of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) that funding liquidity is a driving state variable of commonality in
liquidity, as well as of individual currencies.
Furthermore, recent studies have highlighted the importance of institutional investors behavior and their
correlated trading strategies as a source of commonality in liquidity across stocks (Karolyi et al., 2012).
Extending the analysis to the FX market, we identify correlated trading that demands liquidity on the FX
market by the buying and selling pressure triggered by capital ﬂows between the US and a set of countries.
We ﬁnd changes in these ﬂows to determine the time-variation in FX market illiquidity. Interestingly, these
ﬂows do not seem to use liquidity, but rather to have an aggregate eﬀect, which reduces the bid-ask spreads.
Our empirical investigation also documents a strong relationship between market illiquidity and FX
market uncertainty, measured as the implied volatility in currency options. In addition to the market level
eﬀect, currency volatility aﬀects the illiquidity impact of funding and ﬂows variables.
Our explanatory variables capture an appreciable fraction of the monthly time series variation in market
wide liquidity, around 20% of transaction costs for funding and ﬂows variables. The results are robust to
controlling for measurement of liquidity at another time of the day and ﬁltering for seasonality and the
extreme behavior of the Turkish lira during the 2000-2001 crisis. These explanatory variables are found to
explain unexpected changes in FX market illiquidity as well. Our results with respect to funding constraints
are robust to an alternative liquidity measure, such as the Pastor-Stambaugh.
In conclusion, our study ﬁnds that funding liquidity constraints and capital ﬂows are important deter-
minants of FX market illiquidity and supports the impact of liquidity dry-ups on ﬁnancial markets (Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011).
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Appendix A. Regression of currencies’ illiquidity on market illiquidity
Table 1A: Regression of currencies’ illiquidity on market illiquidity
AUD BRL CAD CHF CLP CZK DKK EUR GBP HUF
Constant -0.0050 -0.0167 -0.0025 -0.0005 0.0048 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0031 -0.0073 0.0079
-0.1685 -0.4311 -0.0748 -0.0229 0.1529 0.0547 0.0016 -0.1161 -0.2326 0.3266
Δilliqt -0.1070 0.6363 0.0920 0.3751 0.6309 0.3820 0.2795 0.2753 0.0933 0.7943
-0.6377 2.8801 0.4893 3.1784 3.5065 2.6392 1.8413 1.7965 0.5198 5.7590
Rbar -0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.16
JPY KRW MXN NOK NZD PLN SEK SGD TRY ZAR
Constant -0.0053 -0.0073 -0.0137 -0.0010 -0.0029 0.0044 -0.0048 -0.0018 0.0057 0.0002
-0.1925 -0.0882 -0.3217 -0.0354 -0.0900 0.1648 -0.2291 -0.0614 0.1500 0.0059
Δilliqt 0.2132 1.2333 0.9239 0.5632 0.6061 0.5891 0.2805 0.3037 2.0278 0.7581
1.3555 2.6211 3.7912 3.4346 3.3464 3.9076 2.3518 1.8168 9.36.84 4.1489
Rbar 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.34 0.09
Notes: The table reports the results of the regression of changes in each individual currencies’ illiquidity on
changes in common market illiquidity:
Δilliqi,t = αi + βiΔilliqt + εi,t (22)
The coeﬃcients are reported in bold when the variable is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%. t-statistics are
adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coeﬃcients. The sample period is from January
1999 to December 2012. The currencies are against the USD and the abbreviation used are the following:
AUD: Australian dollar, BRL: Brazilian real, CAD: Canadian dollar, CHF: Swiss franc, CLP: Chilean peso,
CZK: Czech koruna, DKK: Danish krone, EUR: euro, GBP: Great British pound, HUF: Hungarian forint,
JPY: Japanese yen, KRW: Korean won, MXN: Mexican peso, NOK: Norwegian kroner, NZD: New Zealand
dollar, PLN: Polish zloty, SEK: Swedish krona, SGD: Singapore dollar, TRY: Turkish lira, ZAR: South
African rand.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
a. Levels
FX illiq US repos UK repos US rates UK rates ﬂow vol excret
mean 0.0009 1,579,444 65,090 28.7114 3.5111 3,913,828 10.6655 0.0000
median 0.0008 1,706,992 53153 14.1000 4.4200 3,641,565 10.3150 0.0079
st dev 0.0003 585,774 44,043 37.7056 2.0227 1,726,367 2.5500 0.0890
min 0.0004 572,920 16,898 3.7100 0.4150 1,435,517 5.9500 -0.7126
max 0.0029 2,861,966 166,957 238.730 6.0350 8,395,932 23.0300 0.1499
skew 2.1914 0.0351 0.6976 3.4058 -0.6131 0.4145 1.5867 -4.3993
kurt 8.9237 -0.7765 -0.8766 14.1017 -1.2766 -0.8345 5.0053 30.6176
AC(1) 0.8099 0.9845 0.9814 0.8744 0.9948 0.9210 0.8899 0.0961
b. Diﬀerences
FX illiq US repos UK repos US rates UK rates ﬂow vol
mean -0.0057 0.0061 0.0097 0.0008 -0.0300 0.0069 -0.0022
median -0.0089 0.0083 0.0210 -0.0248 0.0000 0.0225 -0.0116
st dev 0.1752 0.0631 0.1154 0.3408 0.2055 0.1398 0.0948
min -0.5554 -0.2100 -0.3507 -0.8761 -1.7750 -0.4638 -0.2099
max 0.9957 0.1870 0.3205 1.8187 0.3900 0.34468 0.4640
skew 0.9129 -0.0950 -0.2547 1.6873 -4.8839 -0.2156 1.1324
kurt 6.8187 0.7837 0.6519 7.0092 36.4545 0.3038 3.7649
AC(1) -0.3939 -0.1645 0.3157 -0.0304 0.6352 -0.3954 -0.0493
Notes: Descriptive statistics are reported for the illiquidity measure and the explanatory variables. Panel
a shows the descriptive statistics for the FX market illiquidity, US repo amount outstanding (in millions of
USD), UK repo amount outstanding (in millions of GBP), US 3-month LIBOR-OIS spread (in diﬀerences
of percentage points), UK 3-month Gilt repo rates (in percentage points), aggregated capital ﬂows between
the US and relevant countries (in millions of USD), global FX implied volatility (in percentage points) and
value-weighted average excess returns of US ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Panel b shows the descriptive statistics for
the diﬀerences of the variables: the log-diﬀerenced FX market illiquidity, log-diﬀerenced US repo amount
outstanding, log-diﬀerenced UK repo amount outstanding, log-diﬀerenced US LIBOR-OIS spread, diﬀerenced
UK repo rate, log-diﬀerenced aggregated ﬂows and log-diﬀerenced global FX implied volatility. AC(1) refers
to the ﬁrst order autocorrelation of the series.
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Table 2: Correlation matrix
a. Levels
US repos UK repos US rates UK rates ﬂow vol excret
FX illiq -0.46 -0.58 -0.09 0.51 -0.56 -0.03 0.14
US repos 1 0.56 0.45 -0.19 0.86 -0.09 -0.19
UK repos 1 0.35 -0.80 0.67 0.44 -0.14
US rates 1 -0.02 0.36 0.64 -0.11
UK rates 1 -0.39 -0.37 0.07
ﬂow 1 -0.01 -0.24
vol 1 -0.05
b. Diﬀerences
US repos UK repos US rates UK rates ﬂow vol excret
(level)
FX illiq -0.23 -0.24 -0.11 0.01 -0.13 0.18 -0.01
US repos 1 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.05
UK repos 1 -0.12 -0.13 0.03 0.00 0.02
US rates 1 0.06 0.07 0.26 0.03
UK rates 1 0.23 -0.11 0.03
ﬂow 1 0.12 0.04
vol 1 -0.12
Notes: The correlation matrix reports the correlation coeﬃcients between the variables. Panel a shows the
correlation coeﬃcients among FX market illiquidity, US repo amount outstanding, UK repo amount out-
standing, US 3-month LIBOR-OIS spread, UK 3-month Gilt repo rates, aggregated capital ﬂows between the
US and relevant countries, global FX implied volatility and value-weighted average excess returns of US ﬁ-
nancial ﬁrms. Panel b shows the correlation coeﬃcients among the diﬀerences of the variables: log-diﬀerenced
FX market illiquidity, log-diﬀerenced US repo amount outstanding, log-diﬀerenced UK repo amount out-
standing, log-diﬀerenced US LIBOR-OIS spread, diﬀerenced UK repo rate, log-diﬀerenced aggregated ﬂows,
log-diﬀerenced global FX implied volatility. Value-weighted average excess returns of US ﬁnancial ﬁrms are
in levels.
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Table 3: Commonality
1 2 3
Δflowsi 0.00000078
2.6216
vol 1.1084
2.6388
Vi 19.4375
1.9311
rsqi,t−1 0.0367 0.0591 0.0583
1.9671 3.4291 3.3821
constant -3.2673 -3.1662 -3.3048
-37.8860 -44.9244 -33.0415
Rbar 0.05 0.04 0.04
DW 2.00 2.01 2.01
Notes: The table reports the results of the panel regression (13) with ﬁxed eﬀects estimated via OLS:
rsqi,t = α+ βΔXt + δrsqi,t−1 + εt
where rsqi is the monthly series of the logistic-transformation of the R
2 of the regressions of the
illiquidity of currency i on the common component of illiquidity across currencies, and ΔXt =
[ΔreposUSt ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowsi,t, Vi,t, volt]. Δrepos
US and ΔreposUK are
the US and UK repos amount outstanding. ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the US and UK repo rates. excret
are the value-weighted average excess returns of US ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Δflowsi are the series of aggregated
capital ﬂows between each country and the US. Vi are the series of currency realized volatility, calculated as
the monthly standard deviations of daily currency returns. vol is the global FX implied volatility. We run
the regression for each explanatory variable, but we only report them if signiﬁcant for brevity. t-statistics
are reported under the coeﬃcients. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for
the US repo rates for which the sample period starts in 2001.
31
Table 4: VAR analysis
a. VAR(1)
Innovation correlation matrix
US repos UK repos ﬂow
FX illiq -0.15 -0.18 -0.13
US repos 1 0.24 0.13
UK repos 1 0.08
Granger causality
FX illiq US repos UK repos ﬂow
FX illiq - 0.3975 0.0069 0.6207
US repos 0.2969 - 0.0287 0.1847
UK repos 0.6456 0.1977 - 0.1002
ﬂow 0.8908 0.0001 0.5261 -
b. VAR(3)
Innovation correlation matrix
US repos UK repos ﬂow
FX illiq -0.09 -0.10 -0.16
US repos 1 0.18 0.21
UK repos 1 0.09
Granger causality
FX illiq US repos UK repos ﬂow
FX illiq - 0.3376 0.0345 0.0886
US repos 0.2134 - 0.0097 0.9509
UK repos 0.0436 0.4835 - 0.0031
ﬂow 0.0432 0.0074 0.3533 -
Notes: The table reports the results of the structural tests of the VAR estimation (14):
ΔXt = α+
L∑
l=1
βΔXt−l + εt for L = [1, 3]
where ΔX is the matrix with the changes in the endogenous variables: FX market illiquidity, the amount
outstanding of repos in the US and UK and aggregated capital ﬂows. In panel a, the number of lags is 1
according to the Swartz criterion. In panel b, the number of lags is 3 according to the Akaike criterion. The
innovation correlation matrix reports the correlation coeﬃcients of the innovations from the VAR estimation.
The results of the Granger causality tests are the p-values of the column variable Granger causing the row
variable. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012.
32
Table 5: Determinants of FX market illiquidity
1 2 3 4 5 6
ΔreposUS -0.4719
-2.4796
ΔreposUK -0.3277
-2.7986
ΔratesUS -0.0529
-1.5801
ΔratesUK 0.0009
0.0198
excret 0.0022
0.0228
Δflow -0.1852
-2.4790
vol 0.2952 0.2951 0.2710 0.2932 0.2932 0.3275
2.2354 2.2598 2.2049 2.2994 2.2511 2.6359
Δilliqt−1 -0.3586 -0.3683 -0.4416 -0.3855 -0.3855 -0.3824
-3.4365 -3.5369 -6.3563 -3.5596 -3.5767 -3.5384
constant -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0093 -0.0079 -0.0079 -0.0065
-0.4124 -0.4004 -0.9071 0.6670 -0.6566 -0.5454
Rbar 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.19
LMtest 0.48 0.70 0.22 0.44 0.44 0.36
Notes: The table reports the results of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of regression (15) estimated via OLS:
Δilliqt = α+ βΔXt + σvolt + ϕΔilliqt−1 + εt,
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt]. Δrepos
US and ΔreposUK are
the log-diﬀerenced repos amount outstanding in the US and UK respectively, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are
the diﬀerenced repo rates in the US and UK respectively, excret are the ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, Δflow
are the aggregated capital ﬂows between foreign countries and the US. We include the global FX implied
volatility, vol, as a control variable for uncertainty in the market. t-statistics are adjusted via Newey-West
(1987) and reported under the coeﬃcients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values for the null of ﬁrst-order serial
correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to
December 2012, except for the ΔratesUS for which the sample period starts in 2001.
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Table 6: Cost and maturity of repos and the liquidity eﬀect of funding constraints
1 2 3
dummy+rates ∗ΔreposUS -0.6746
-1.8251
dummy−rates ∗ΔreposUS -0.3939
-1.8345
dummy+rates ∗ΔreposUK -0.3747
-3.3719
dummy−rates ∗ΔreposUK -0.2898
-1.5607
dummy−mat ∗ΔreposUS -0.5643
-2.2971
dummy+mat ∗ΔreposUS -0.3334
-1.3649
vol 0.2967 0.2859 0.2850
2.2501 2.1315 2.1921
Δilliqt−1 -0.3561 -0.3704 -0.3562
-3.4204 -3.4898 -3.4081
constant -0.0044 -0.0054 -0.0022
-0.3776 -0.4718 -0.1592
Rbar 0.19 0.21 0.19
LMtest 0.49 0.74 0.50
Notes: The table reports the results of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of regression (16) estimated via OLS:
Δilliqt = α+ β
+(dummy+ ∗ΔXt) + β−(dummy− ∗ΔXt) + σvolt + ϕΔilliqt−1 + εt
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ]. Δrepos
US and ΔreposUK are the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the amount
outstanding of repos in the US and UK. dummy+ and dummy− are dummies for increases and decreases in
repo rates or maturities. For rates, dummy+ and dummy− take the value of 1 when the rates increase and
decrease respectively, and 0 otherwise. They are calculated for the US and UK and interacted with their repo
amount outstanding respective measure. For the maturity, dummy− and dummy+ take the value of 1 for
shortening and lengthening respectively of the maturities of the repos in the US market, and 0 otherwise. We
include the global FX implied volatility, vol, as a control variable for uncertainty in the market. t-statistics
are adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coeﬃcients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values
for the null of ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two rows. The sample
period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the US repo rate interaction for which the sample
period starts in 2001.
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Table 7: The recent ﬁnancial crisis
1 2 3 4 5 6
dummycrisis ∗ΔreposUS -0.7470
-2.8796
dummynocrisis ∗ΔreposUS -0.4207
-1.9649
dummycrisis ∗ΔreposUK -0.4600
-1.8208
dummynocrisis ∗ΔreposUK -0.3080
-2.4271
dummycrisis ∗ΔratesUS -0.1394
-1.3469
dummynocrisis ∗ΔratesUS -0.0414
-1.3407
dummycrisis ∗ΔratesUK -0.0192
-0.6475
dummynocrisis ∗ΔratesUK 0.0514
0.3899
dummycrisis ∗ excret -0.8853
-2.1413
dummynocrisis ∗ excret 0.0545
0.5669
dummycrisis ∗Δflow -0.3459
-1.9834
dummynocrisis ∗Δflow -0.1567
-1.9270
vol 0.2960 0.3107 0.2913 0.2900 0.3107 0.3346
2.2329 2.3888 2.2854 2.2477 2.4049 2.7983
Δilliqt−1 -0.3591 -0.3677 -0.4501 -0.3845 -0.3970 -0.3891
-3.4259 -3.5398 -6.410 -3.5273 -3.5937 -3.5598
constant -0.0059 -0.0044 -0.0101 -0.0083 -0.0070 -0.0071
-0.4971 -0.3800 -0.9824 0.6835 -0.5877 -0.5821
Rbar 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.16 0.17 0.18
LMtest 0.48 0.67 0.31 0.45 0.48 0.41
Notes: The table reports the results of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of regression (17) estimated via OLS:
Δilliqt = α+ β(dummy
crisis
t ∗ΔXt) + γ(dummynocrisist ∗ΔXt) + δvolt + ϕΔilliqt−1 + εt
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt]. Δrepos
US and ΔreposUK are
the log-diﬀerenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced
repo rates in the US and UK, excret are ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, Δflow are the aggregated capital
ﬂows between foreign countries and the US, and vol is the global FX implied volatility. dummycrisis takes
the value of 1 during the period from Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 to July 2009, when
the US recession ended, and 0 otherwise. dummynocrisis takes the value of 0 for the crisis episode, and 1
otherwise. t-statistics are adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coeﬃcients. Adjusted R2
and LM test p-values for the null of ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two
rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the ΔratesUS for which the
sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 8: Panel analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Vi 9.0072
4.8873
Vi ∗ΔreposUS -22.7146
-1.7968
Vi ∗ΔreposUK -4.3081
-0.6701
Vi ∗ΔratesUS -1.8225
-0.7180
Vi ∗ΔratesUK -4.3298
-2.2170
Vi ∗ excret 4.1207
0.4200
Vi ∗Δflow -15.6897
-2.8559
illiqi,t−1 -0.4347 -0.4322 -0.4334 -0.4548 -0.4345 -0.4334 -0.4329
-27.7670 -27.5062 -27.5889 -26.1806 -27.6694 -27.5943 -27.5878
constant -0.0703 -0.0079 -0.0079 -0.0074 -0.0107 -0.0083 -0.0083
-4.8109 -1.0887 -1.0844 -0.9338 -1.4506 1.1337 -1.1423
Rbar 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18
DW 2.25 2.24 2.24 2.27 2.24 2.24 2.25
Notes: The table reports the results of the speciﬁcations of the panel regression (18) with ﬁxed eﬀects:
Δilliqi,t = α+ β(ΔXt ∗ Vi,t) + ϕilliqi,t−1 + εt
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt] and Vi are the series of monthly
standard deviation of daily currency returns. ΔreposUS and ΔreposUK are the log-diﬀerenced repo amount
outstanding in the US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced repo rates in the US and UK,
excret are the ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, and Δflow are the aggregated capital ﬂows between foreign
countries and the US. t-statistics are reported under the coeﬃcients. Adjusted R2 and Durbin-Watson test
for the null of ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two rows. The sample
period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the ΔratesUS for which the sample period starts
in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 9: Panel analysis and the ﬁnancial crisis
1 2 3 4 5 6
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ΔreposUS -41.8072
-2.2562
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ΔreposUS -5.6848
-0.3251
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ΔreposUK 2.4703
0.2746
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ΔreposUK -11.3332
-1.2376
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ΔratesUS -1.3739
-0.2773
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ΔratesUS -1.9837
-0.6694
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ΔratesUK -3.7102
-1.8621
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ΔratesUK -18.8232
-1.9844
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗ excret -27.7655
-1.1764
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗ excret 10.8170
1.0020
dummycrisis ∗ Vi ∗Δflow -13.5729
-1.6636
dummynocrisis ∗ Vi ∗Δflow -17.4627
-2.3397
illiqi,t−1 -0.4328 -0.4335 -0.4548 -0.4355 -0.4344 -0.4325
-27.5374 -27.5971 -26.1629 -27.7153 -27.6365 -27.5143
constant -0.0096 -0.0080 -0.0073 -0.0108 -0.0077 -0.0081
-1.2972 -1.0944 -0.9226 -1.4661 1.0603 -1.1130
Rbar 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.18
DW 2.25 2.24 2.27 2.25 2.24 2.25
Notes: The table reports the results of the speciﬁcations of the panel regression (19) with ﬁxed eﬀects:
Δilliqi,t = α+ β(ΔXt ∗ Vi,t ∗ dummycrisist ) + γ(ΔXt ∗ Vi,t ∗ dummynocrisist ) + ϕilliqi,t−1 + εt
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt] and Vi are the series of monthly
standard deviation of daily currency returns. dummycrisis takes the value of 1 during the recent ﬁnancial
crisis from September 2008 to June 2009, and 0 otherwise; dummynocrisis takes the value of 0 during the
crisis, and 1 otherwise. ΔreposUS and ΔreposUK are the log-diﬀerenced repo amount outstanding in the
US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are ﬁnancial
ﬁrms’ excess returns, and Δflow are the aggregated capital ﬂows between foreign countries and the US.
t-statistics are reported under the coeﬃcients. Adjusted R2 and Durbin-Watson test for the null of ﬁrst-
order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two rows. The sample period is from January
1999 to December 2012, except for the ΔratesUS for which the sample period starts in 2001 due to data
availability.
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Table 10: Determinants of FX market illiquidity, at a less liquid time
1 2 3 4 5 6
ΔreposUS -1.0886
-2.8522
ΔreposUK -0.5819
-3.1188
ΔratesUS -0.1064
-1.5973
ΔratesUK -0.1263
-1.3119
excret 0.0682
0.3176
Δflow -0.3546
-2.5647
vol 0.6749 0.6771 0.7831 0.6461 0.6842 0.7421
2.9684 3.0937 3.3262 2.8204 3.0699 3.3965
Δilliqt−1 -0.4044 -0.4168 -0.5079 -0.4335 -0.4269 -0.4242
-4.7329 -5.0295 -6.5651 -5.1332 -4.9805 -5.0161
constant 0.0059 0.0049 -0.0009 -0.0046 -0.0007 0.0019
0.2891 0.2480 -0.0476 -0.2341 -0.0361 -0.0919
Rbar 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.22 0.21 0.23
LMtest 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05
Notes: The table reports the results of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of regression (15) estimated via OLS with
an alternative dependent variable, constructed with data observed at the 21.50 GMT:
ΔilliqNY timet = α+ βΔXt + σvolt + ϕΔilliq
NY time
t−1 + εt,
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt]. Δrepos
US and ΔreposUK are
the log-diﬀerenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced
repo rates in the US and UK, excret are ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, Δflow are the aggregated capital
ﬂows between foreign countries and the US. We include the global FX implied volatility, vol, as a control
variable for uncertainty in the market. t-statistics are adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under
the coeﬃcients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values for the null of ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the residuals
are reported in the last two rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for
the ΔratesUS for which the sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 11: Determinants of FX market illiquidity, ﬁltering for seasonality and excluding the Turkish lira
a. Excluding the TRY
1 2 3 4 5 6
ΔreposUS -0.3919
-2.2967
ΔreposUK -0.3563
-3.4300
ΔratesUS -0.0498
-1.4698
ΔratesUK -0.0453
-1.1427
excret 0.0065
0.0666
Δflow -0.1848
-2.8152
vol 0.3253 0.3256 0.3531 0.3118 0.3242 0.3594
2.8420 2.5515 2.8338 2.8820 2.8410 3.7150
Δilliqt−1 -0.4441 -0.4513 -0.4661 -0.4815 -0.4732 -0.4536
-6.3673 -6.4968 -5.7108 -6.8549 -6.8138 -6.8653
constant -0.0058 -0.0048 -0.0061 -0.0099 -0.0084 -0.0069
-0.6188 -0.5133 -0.6098 -0.9882 -0.8592 -0.7303
Rbar 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.28
LMtest 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.04
b. Filtering for seasonality
ΔreposUS -0.0003
-2.1747
ΔreposUK -0.0003
-3.5189
ΔratesUS 0.0000
-1.7682
ΔratesUK 0.0000
-0.7015
excret 0.0000
-0.3199
Δflow -0.0001
-2.2842
vol 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
2.7099 2.5055 2.9009 2.7411 2.7076 2.9729
Δilliqt−1 -0.4487 -0.4465 -0.4808 -0.4812 -0.4776 -0.4587
-6.3273 -6.2657 -5.6843 -6.7410 -6.8258 -6.8590
constant 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.6586 -0.5134 -0.5531 -0.9607 -0.8872 -0.7732
Rbar 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.28
LMtest 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.06
Notes: The table reports the results of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of regression (15) estimated via OLS with
two alternative dependent variables, excluding the TRY from the sample of currencies in panel a and ﬁltering
the transaction cost measures for seasonality in panel b:
Δilliqt = α+ βΔXt + σvolt + ϕΔilliqt−1 + εt,
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt]. Δrepos
US and ΔreposUK are
the log-diﬀerenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced
repo rates in the US and UK, excret are ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, Δflow are the aggregated capital
ﬂows between foreign countries and the US. We include the global FX implied volatility, vol, to account
for uncertainty in the market. t-statistics are adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the
coeﬃcients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values for the null of ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the residuals
are reported in the last two rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for
the ΔratesUS for which the sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 12: Determinants of shocks to FX market illiquidity
1 2 3 4 5 6
ΔreposUS -0.4562
-2.6147
ΔreposUK -0.3245
-2.8283
ΔratesUS -0.0.0553
-1.6474
ΔratesUK 0.0002
0.0045
excret 0.0018
0.0180
Δflow -0.1849
-2.4504
vol 0.2906 0.2917 0.2806 0.2918 0.2919 0.3258
2.2684 2.3022 2.2522 2.3616 2.3066 2.6970
constant -0.0052 -0.0048 -0.0089 -0.0080 -0.0080 -0.0066
-0.4392 0.4163 -0.8870 -0.6798 -0.6654 -0.6798
Rbar 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04
LMtest 0.75 0.92 0.09 0.50 0.50 0.43
Notes: The table reports the results of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of regression (15) (excluding the lagged
dependent variable) estimated via OLS with the shocks in FX market illiquidity as the dependent variable:
ΔilliqUNEXPt = α+ βΔXt + σvolt + εt,
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt] and Δilliq
UNEXP are the
residuals from the regression of FX market illiquidity on its lag. ΔreposUS and ΔreposUK are the log-
diﬀerenced repo amount outstanding in the US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced repo
rates in the US and UK, excret are ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, Δflow are the aggregated capital ﬂows
between foreign countries and the US. We include the global FX implied volatility, vol, to account for un-
certainty in the market. t-statistics are adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coeﬃcients.
Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values for the null of ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the residuals are reported
in the last two rows. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2012, except for the ΔratesUS
for which the sample period starts in 2001 due to data availability.
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Table 13: Determinants of FX market liquidity, measured as market depth
1 2 3 4 5 6
ΔreposUS 0.0043
2.0893
ΔreposUK 0.0000
-0.0206
ΔratesUS 0.0004
0.6381
ΔratesUK 0.0011
0.6893
excret -0.0021
-0.9526
Δflow -0.0009
-0.5028
vol -0.0046 -0.0039 -0.0049 -0.0039 0-0.0045 -0.0037
-1.6190 -1.3776 -1.3936 -1.3638 -1.5268 -1.2397
Δilliqt−1 -0.5177 -0.4874 -0.4585 -0.4978 -0.4952 -0.4844
-7.8736 -7.3925 -5.3605 -7.1860 -7.5886 -7.6807
constant -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.3009 -0.1588 -0.4265 -0.1520 -0.1188 -0.0966
Rbar 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24
LMtest 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.06
Notes: The table reports the results of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of regression (15) estimated via OLS with
the Pastor-Stambaugh measure as the dependent variable:
Δliqt = α+ βΔXt + σvolt + ϕΔliqt−1 + εt,
where ΔXt = [Δrepos
US
t ,Δrepos
UK
t ,Δrates
US
t ,Δrates
UK
t , excrett,Δflowt] and Δliq is the Pastor-
Stambaugh liquidity measure. ΔreposUS and ΔreposUK are the log-diﬀerenced repo amount outstanding
in the US and UK, ΔratesUS and ΔratesUK are the diﬀerenced repo rates in the US and UK, excret are
ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ excess returns, Δflow are the aggregated capital ﬂows between foreign countries and the US.
We include the global FX implied volatility, vol, to account for uncertainty in the market. t-statistics are
adjusted via Newey-West (1987) and reported under the coeﬃcients. Adjusted R2 and LM test p-values for
the null of ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the residuals are reported in the last two rows. The sample period
is from January 1999 to July 2008, except for the ΔratesUS for which the sample period starts in 2001 due
to data availability.
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Figure 1: FX market illiquidity The FX market illiquidity is calculated as the cross-sectional average of
percentage bid-ask spreads across the 20 currencies in the sample against the USD. The shaded area indicates
the recent ﬁnancial crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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Figure 2: FX market illiquidity excluding the TRY The FX market illiquidity is calculated as the
cross-sectional average of percentage bid-ask spreads across the 19 currencies in the sample against the USD.
The shaded area indicates the recent ﬁnancial crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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(a) US
(b) UK
Figure 3: Repo amount outstanding in the US and UK. The amount outstanding in the US is in
millions of USD and the amount outstanding in the UK is in millions of GBP. The shaded area indicates the
recent ﬁnancial crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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(a) US
(b) UK
Figure 4: Repo rates in the US and UK. Repo rates in the US are proxied by the 3-month LIBOR-OIS
spread, starting from 2001, and it is in percentage points. Repo rates in the UK are the 3-month Gilt repo
rates, and are expressed in percentage points. The shaded area indicates the recent ﬁnancial crisis from
September 2008 to June 2009.
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Figure 5: Financial ﬁrms’ excess returns The graph shows the common component in ﬁnancial ﬁrms’
excess returns in the US. Excess returns are obtained as the residuals from a one factor model and they are
the value-weighted average across ﬁrms. The shaded area indicates the recent ﬁnancial crisis from September
2008 to June 2009.
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Figure 6: Aggregated capital ﬂows The graph shows the aggregated ﬂows of equity and bond investments
between the US and foreign countries. The ﬂows are the sum of the inﬂows and outﬂows aggregated across
countries. The shaded area indicates the recent ﬁnancial crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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Figure 7: Global FX volatility The graph shows the global FX volatility implied in currency options. The
shaded area indicates the recent ﬁnancial crisis from September 2008 to June 2009.
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